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in delusion-prone individuals
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Summary
Aim. The aim of the study was to investigate whether the delusion-prone individuals tend to select rele-
vant information among distractors in order to examine whether the occurrence of overt delusions could 
be preceded by specific features of attention functioning. 
Methods. Individuals with high and low susceptibility to delusions completed the experimental task rely-
ing on the search for the specified signal hidden among distractors.
results. The delusion-prone individuals did not select emotionally neutral signal more effectively than the 
non delusion-prone ones. What is more, they made more ‘false-alarm’ mistakes than the control group, 
especially at the later stage of the task related to the increased fatigue level. 
Conclusion. The delusion-proneness is not related to the excessive information selection ability.
delusion-proneness / signal detection / selective attention
INTrOdUCTION
The hypothesis that delusions are distrib-
uted in general population as a continuum 
from the absence of delusional beliefs to the 
overt delusions has received growing atten-
tion in recent years [1, 2, 3, 4]. According to 
this hypothesis delusional ideations could be 
observed not only in clinical, but also in non 
– clinical groups, however in general popula-
tion these thinking disturbances are not as in-
tense and distressing as delusions being symp-
toms of pathology. This continuum perspec-
tive allows us to examine the development of 
some psychopathological symptoms by inves-
tigating emotional and cognitive phenomenon 
which could be a basis of unusual conviction.
Studies examining reasoning disturbances 
along the continuum of delusions indicated 
that so called ‘delusion-prone’ individuals re-
veal the reasoning bias reflected by hastiness 
in decision making and the tendency to gath-
er few information concerning the decision, 
even if the additional data is easily available. 
What is more, they could also be more con-
vinced than other people that they made the 
right decisions [5, 6, 7]. This phenomenon, de-
scribed as ‘jumping to conclusion bias’, is also 
observed in individuals with delusions [7, 8, 
9, 10] and some authors regard it as a cogni-
tive mechanism being a base of delusion for-
mation [11, 12, 13].
However, one of the most visible feature of 
delusions is a strong belief that their convic-
tions are appropriate to reality and defies ra-
tional counterarguments [14]; thus, delusional 
thinking seems to demand extraordinary abil-
ity to search for information matching the de-
lusional ideation. They should tend to support 
once formulated beliefs by selecting informa-
tion rather than present the bizarre, irration-6	 Katarzyna	Prochwicz,	Jagoda	Różycka
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al thinking. On the one hand, they should be 
able to capture subjectively valuable informa-
tion quickly and efficiently; on the other hand, 
they should protect their cognitive system by 
ignoring facts which undermine their delu-
sional convictions. It follows that the individ-
uals susceptible to delusions could be charac-
terized by some general attention properties, 
such as the extended ability to notice previous-
ly accepted rules or facts. However, their ten-
dency to make decisions hastily and without 
sufficient data suggests that they are not inter-
ested in searching for additional information, 
even if they could support their convictions.
The first aim of the current study was to in-
vestigate the general ability of delusion-prone 
individuals to select information, i.e. to select 
the pre-defined signal among the distractors 
in order to examine whether the susceptibility 
to delusions could be related to the extensive 
ability to search for the relevant information 
occurring among informational noise. It was 
predicted that the participants susceptible to 
delusions would search for suitable informa-
tion more efficiently than the control group, 
i.e. more quickly and making less errors.
The second aim of the study was to investi-
gate the ability of the delusional-prone indi-
viduals to change the previously accepted and 
applied rules of information selection. It was 
assumed that they would reveal more prob-
lems than the control group in the assimila-
tion of new rules of information selection since 
they would perform less efficiently in condi-
tions when they are forced to behave in ac-
cordance with the redefined information se-
lection criteria.
SUBJECTS
The sample consisted of 87 healthy Pedagog-
ical University students, 82 women and 5 men. 
The age of participants ranged from 19 to 29 
years old, with mean age 20. 31 (SD=1.31). All 
participants signed informed consent after be-
ing provided with a full description of the task. 
All participants completed the study voluntar-
ily during the single experimental session.
Participants completed Peters et al. Delusions 
Inventory [2] (see below), and were divided at 
the median into two groups: delusion-prone 
individuals, and non delusion-prone ones. In 
the current study the median was 13.
The delusion-prone group consisted of 41 
students, 38 women and 3 men (mean age 
20.38, SD=1.68). Within this group the PDI 
scores range from 14 to 25. The non-delu-
sion- -prone (control) group was composed of 
45 students, 43 women and 2 men (mean age 
19.84; SD=2.86) with PDI scores ranging from 
2 to 13. The two groups of participants did not 
differ in terms of age (t(85)= – 0.47; p<0.63).
MATErIAlS ANd METHOdS
Peters’ et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) [2]. 
PDI is the questionnaire measuring delusional 
ideation in general population. It consists of 40 
items related to unusual experiences. Respons-
es to the PDI are in dichotomous (Yes/No) for-
mat. ‘Yes’ answers are subsequently assessed 
for the dimensions of ‘distress’, ‘preoccupa-
tion’, ‘conviction’ on a 5 – point Likert scales; 
thus, the PDI provides four separate scores: 
the Yes/No score, a distress score, a preoccupa-
tion score, and the conviction score. The Polish 
version of PDI has demonstrated good inter-
nal consistency (Cronbachs’ alpha for the Yes/
No score = 0.88 [15]).
The experimental task. At the beginning of 
the task each participant is given a sheet of pa-
per with 400 clock icons set horizontally (20 
lines with 20 icons in each line). The icons 
present full hours, and one of them – in the 
current study the icon showing 5.00 p.m. hour 
– was defined as a signal. Participants were 
asked to detect as many signals as possible 
during 2 minute – interval and mark them in 
any way. When the time was over, participants 
had to mark the icon which he/she analyzed 
as the last one in order to indicate how many 
icons they were able to analyze. There were 
40 signals on the sheet of paper. The remain-
ing icons constitute information noise, where-
as the 4.00 pm icon, which is most similar to 
the signal and could be easily mistaken for it, 
was treated as a distractor. In the current study 
participants executed the task three times with 
2 minute – intervals in between. Later on, in 
the last execution of the task, the participants 	 The	neutral	stimuli	detection	deficits	in	delusion-prone	individuals		 7
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were asked to mark the 4.00 pm icon being 
a distractor in the previous three tasks. This 
procedure	was	invited	by	Marciusz	Moroń,	
and was described in detail by Szymura and 
Słabosz	[16].
rESUlTS
The data were assessed and evaluated by 
Statistica 10.0 software. Analysis of variance 
and Student’s t-test were employed for statis-
tical analysis. The results were considered as 
statistically significant with a p value of less 
than 0.05.
The task provides measures which repre-
sent the efficiency of analyzing and selecting 
information: the number of icons analyzed; 
the number of errors relies on marking an icon 
other than a signal (FA), the number of errors 
relies on missing the correct signal (OM); the 
total number of errors (D); and the proportion 
of	different	types	of	errors	(β=FA/D).	All	these	
parameters were measured at each stage of the 
experimental task.
Regarding the number of icons searched for 
by participants, the 2 (groups) x 3 (test exe-
cutions relied on the search for the 5.00 p.m. 
icon) ANOVA analysis did not reveal the main 
effect (F<1). The between – group comparison 
showed that the delusion-prone students and 
the non delusion-prone ones did not differ sig-
nificantly in the total number of icons analyzed 
during the three initial executions of the task 
(t(87)=0.58; p<0.55). The two groups of partic-
ipants also did not differ in the first, the sec-
ond and the third test performance; thus, we 
could not conclude that individuals suscepti-
ble to delusions search for neutral information 
more quickly than other people.
In terms of the total number of mistakes (D) 
the 2 (groups) x 3 (number of task executions) 
also did not reveal the main effect (F<1). The 
total number of errors made by delusion-prone 
and non delusion-prone individuals also did 
not yield significant difference (t(87)=0.57; 
p<0.56), even if it was counted separately for 
the first, the second and the third test execu-
tion (see Tab.1). 
Table 1. The numbers of icons analyzed and the mean numbers of mistakes made in the four executions of the experimental 
task by the delusion-prone group and non delusion-prone participants.
Delusion-prone group Non delusion-prone group
Numbers of icons analyzed
M (SD) M (SD) t (87) p
Test 1 332.69 (68.06) 327.62 (57.54) 0.02 0.98
Test 2 366.70 (50.77) 374.04 (42.64) 0.80 0.42
Test 3 376.71 (37.79) 385.71 (23.38) 0.88 0.30
Test 4 344.66 (53.92) 356.11 (44.36) 1.09 0.25
Total number of mistakes (D)
M (SD) M (SD) t (87) p
Test 1 11.66 (7.32) 11.80 (8.37) - 0.08 0.93
Test 2 10.85 (6.70) 11.75 (6.27)   0.03 0.97
Test 3 10.19 (5.77) 10.60 (5.76) - 0.49 0.62
Test 4  9.75 (5.90)   7.75 (5.56) - 1.63 0.10
Omitting mistakes (OM)
M (SD) M (SD) t (87) p
Test 1 11.00 (7.14) 11.40 (7.86)  0.02 0.98
Test 2 10.35 (6.32) 11.44 (6.18)  0.25 0.80
Test 3 9.71 (5.64) 10.35 (5.68) - 0.23 0.81
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Test 4 9.54 (5.93)  7.42 (5.51) -1.72 0.08
‘False alarm’ mistakes (FA)
M (SD) M (SD) t (87) p
Test 1 0.66 (1.18) 0.4 (1.05)   0.74 0.45
Test 2 0.50 (1.89) 0.31(0.55) - 1.02 0.30
Test 3 0.47(0.74) 0.24 (0.57) - 2.38 0.01
Test 4 0.21 (0.41) 0.32 (0.61)   0.94 0.34
The comparison of the number of errors re-
lying on omitting the correct signal (OM) also 
did not reveal significant differences. The 2 
(groups) x 3 (test executions) ANOVA analy-
sis did not reveal the main effect (F<1). Nei-
ther did the between – groups comparisons of 
the total number of omitting errors (t(87)=0.02; 
p<0.97), and the comparisons made separate-
ly for the first, the second and the third ex-
ecutions of the test. Regarding the number 
of ‘false alarm’ errors (FA), relying on mark-
ing the icon which was not the signal, the 2 
x 3 ANOVA also did not show the main ef-
fect (F<1); however, the between – groups com-
parisons reveal that the delusion-prone par-
ticipants made significantly more ‘false alarm’ 
mistakes than the non delusion-prone students 
in the last search for the 5.00 p.m. icon (t(87)= – 
2.38; p<0.01). What is more, the comparisons of 
the total number of ‘false alarm’ errors reveal 
that the delusion-prone individuals marked 
incorrect signals more often than non delusion-
-prone students; however, this difference did 
not reach the level of statistical significance 
(t(87)= – 1.83; p<0.06) (see Tab. 1). The strate-
gies	of	test	performances	measured	with	the	β	
parameter	(β=FA/D)	did	not	differ	significant-
ly between the groups (F<1).
At the last stage of the task, the participants 
were asked to search for the icon representing 
the 4.00 pm hour which was a distractor in the 
previous three tasks. It was expected that this 
instruction change would disturb the level of 
performance in both the delusion-prone and 
the non delusion-prone groups; however, the 
participants susceptible to delusions should 
bear the higher costs of the change of the once 
accepted rules than those without delusions 
proneness.
Regarding of the number of icons searched 
for, the 2 (groups) x 2 (the third and the fourth 
test executions) ANOVA showed that there 
was not a significant difference between the 
number of icons analyzed by delusion-prone 
and non delusion-prone students between the 
third and the fourth test performances (F<1). In 
the last execution of the task the two groups of 
participants found the similar number of icons 
(t(87)=0.58; p<0.55).
In terms of errors, the 2 (groups) x 2 (the third 
and the fourth test executions) ANOVA analysis 
also did not reveal the main effect of the groups 
(F<1) for both the total number of errors (D), and 
for the ‘omitted mistakes’ (OM) (F[1.174]=1.11; 
p<0.29). Similarly, in conditions, when the in-
struction was changed the two groups of par-
ticipants did not differ in the total number of er-
rors being made (t(87)= –1.63; p<0.10), and the 
number of errors relying on omitting the correct 
signal. However, in the last execution of the task, 
the delusion prone and non delusion-prone par-
ticipants differed significantly regarding of ‘false 
alarm’ errors (FA): 2 (groups) x 2 ANOVA (the 
third and the fourth test executions) revealed the 
main effect for the group (F[1.174]=5.90; p<0.01, 
see Fig. 1). Although, the comparison of ‘false 
alarm’ showed that when the signal was rede-
fined, the participants susceptible to delusions 
and the control group once again made sim-
ilar amount of FA errors (see Tab. 1). Regard-
ing of the proportion of different types of errors 
(β=FA/D),	the	2	(groups)	x	2	ANOVA	(the	third	
and the fourth test executions) also revealed the 
effect which approached to the level of signifi-
cance (F[1.174]=3.57; p<0.06).
dISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to inves-
tigate whether the individuals with higher 
score on PDI questionnaire are characterized 
by the excessive ability to select information 
relevant to a predefined rule. It was predict-
ed that participants with the high PDI score 	 The	neutral	stimuli	detection	deficits	in	delusion-prone	individuals		 9
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Figure 1. The number of ‘false alarm’ errors made by the delusion-prone group and the non-delusion-prone participants  
in the third and the fourth execusion of the task
would search for the signal hidden among in-
formation noise and distractors more efficient-
ly than those with the low PDI score, i.e. they 
would search for more icons, and they would 
made fewer mistakes than the non-delusion-
-prone ones.
Contrarily to the prediction, the results 
showed that the delusion-prone group did 
not differ from the non delusion-prone one 
in respect of the speed of performance (i.e. 
the number of analyzed icons). What is more, 
they made more ‘false alarm’ errors. It sug-
gests that they are more impulsive than the 
individuals not susceptible to delusions: they 
react quickly and carelessly and prefer mark-
ing the incorrect signal rather than omitting 
the correct one. Although the delusion-prone 
individuals made more ‘false alarm’ errors in 
all test performances relying on the search for 
the 5.00 pm icon, the tendency to react impul-
sively was particularly visible in the third ex-
ecution of the task when the participants were 
processing the same, undifferentiated materi-
al for the third time; thus, the level of fatigue 
was the highest. These results obtained by the 
group with the high PDI score contrast with 
the results occurring typically in this type of 
research. Participants usually improve their 
performance subsequently, reaching the best 
score (i.e. make fewer mistakes) at the last ex-
ecution of the task [16] since the multiple repe-
tition of behavior is usually related to the skills 
acquisition. The relation between the delusion- 
-proneness and the duration of the task sug-
gests that in conditions when individuals sus-
ceptible to delusions feel tired or notice that 
the efficiency of their performance is decreas-
ing for some others reasons, they change reac-
tion strategy. They start to react to each stimu-
lus which for them seems to be at least slight-
ly similar to the signal, since they prefer react 
even if it is not necessary rather than to take a 
risk meaning that they would mistakenly ig-
nore the important signal. Although this strat-
egy could be associated with the increased ef-
fort, for the delusion-prone individuals this 
more could seem to be safer.
In the delusion-prone group the change of 
signal caused the sudden reduction of the 
number of the ‘false alarm’ errors. In condi-
tions when the new rule of signal detection 
was introduced, the delusion-prone individ-
uals reacted more correctly than controls. On 
the one hand, the novelty of the situation could 
reduce the degree of boredom and weariness, 
thus improving the performance in partici-
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pants who are particularly prone to boredom. 
On the other hand, in the new circumstances 
the individuals susceptible to delusions should 
become more vigilance than in circumstances 
which seem familiar, since the novelty of the 
situation could enhance their suspicious atti-
tudes, and cause the decrease of their appre-
hension level.
CONClUSIONS
To  sum  up,  the  hypothesis  that  delu 
sion-proneness is related to enhancing the gen-
eral ability to select information was not con-
firmed. In the current study, in which the neu-
tral stimuli were used as experimental materi-
al, the delusion-prone group did not search for 
the signal more efficiently than controls. Con-
trarily, the results indicate that the individuals 
with subclinical form of delusions tend to re-
act more impulsively than others. These results 
are closer to the findings that they are charac-
terized by the tendency to hasty decision mak-
ing. They do not support the hypothesis of their 
particular carefulness in information selection. 
However, these results do not exclude the pos-
sibility that in daily functioning, especially in 
situations related to the delusional ideations, 
the delusion-prone individuals search for the 
subjectively valuable information more quick-
ly and correctly than people without subclinical 
forms of delusions. The second hypothesis say-
ing that the delusion-pone participants should 
bear the high costs of change the rules of infor-
mation searching also was not confirmed. Con-
trarily, the results showed that the individuals 
with subclinical forms of delusions could adapt 
to the new instructions more easily than others, 
since the novelty of situations enhanced their 
searching skills rather than petrificate the lack 
of flexibility of their cognitive processes. How-
ever, once again it is worth to noting that this 
finding is related only to the neutral conditions; 
thus, it does not reflect the delusion-prone indi-
viduals behaviors in the situation involving the 
delusional themes.
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